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Aൻඌඍඋൺർඍ
Using standard fi scal incidence analysis, this paper estimates the impact of 
tax and expenditure policies on income distribution and poverty in Argentina 
with data from the National Household Survey on Incomes and Expenditures 
2012-2013. The results show that fi scal policy has been a powerful tool in 
reducing inequality and poverty but that the unusually high levels of public 
spending may make the programs unsustainable. The impact of several 
policy measures carried out by the government have also been simulated. 
Keywords:  Taxes, public expenditures, inequality, poverty.
JEL codes: H2; I3; D3.
Rൾඌඎආൾඇ
Utilizando un análisis de incidencia fi scal estándar, este trabajo estima el 
impacto de las políticas tributarias y de gasto público en la distribución 
del ingreso y la pobreza en Argentina con datos de la Encuesta Nacional 
de Gastos de los Hogares 2012-2013. Los resultados muestran que la 
políticas fi scal ha sido una poderosa herramienta en la reducción de la 
desigualdad y la pobreza pero los inusualmente elevados niveles de gasto 
público podrían hacer que los programas resulten no sustentables. Se ha 
simulado también el impacto de algunas medidas de política fi scal llevadas 
a cabo por el gobierno. 
Palabras clave: impuestos, gastos públicos, desigualdad, pobreza.
Código JEL: H2; I3; D3.
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I. Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
Public policy design requires knowledge of how benefi ts and taxes 
are distributed across different welfare levels. This study evaluates the im-
pact of taxes and public expenditures on income distribution and poverty to 
determine whether they reduce income inequality and poverty or, converse-
ly, if they indirectly exacerbate income inequality. 
This paper estimates the impact of tax and expenditure policies on 
income distribution and poverty amelioration in Argentina using the CEQ 
methodology with data from the National Household Survey on Incomes 
and Expenditures (ENGHo), which was conducted by the National Bureau 
of Statistics in Argentina from March 2012 to February 2013. Consequently, 
the paper uses the codes for taxes and public expenditures from 2012. 
The project Commitment to Equity (Commitment to Equity Institute, 
Tulane University, New Orleans, USA) has advanced in the harmonization 
and coordination of the effects of the different dimensions in which public 
sector intervenes in the economy with the aim of reducing poverty and ine-
qualities on income distribution. 
The results show an important incidence of fi scal policy in Argen-
tina for the reduction of inequalities and poverty levels. However, several 
issues should be taken into account when considering their sustainability; 
consequently, three different policy simulations (similar to the ones already 
carried out by the government) have been performed and their results were 
compared with the benchmark case
The study is organized as follows: section 2 briefl y reviews the re-
sults of previous studies on the impact of taxes and expenditures on income 
distribution. Section 3 outlines Argentina’s tax structure and the quantitative 
evolution of its taxes and expenditures. Section 4 introduces the data source 
and incidence assumptions for the CEQ analysis of the impact of taxes and 
expenditures; section 5 presents the regulatory framework for the taxes and 
expenditures included in the incidence analysis. Section 6 summarizes the 
results of the incidence analysis on income distribution and poverty, while 
Section 7 delivers the results of the policy simulations. Section 8 offers 
concluding remarks.
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Several studies on Argentina have analyzed the impact of taxes and 
expenditures, together or separately, on income distribution. However, very 
few have analyzed their impact on poverty (some have tried to capture the 
impact of specifi c social programs) and no one has estimated the impact of 
taxes on poverty. This is the fi rst study to use CEQ methodology (Lustig 
and Higgins, 2013 a, b) to examine the effects of taxes and expenditures on 
income inequality and poverty reduction in Argentina.
Some research on tax incidence analysis in Argentina is available. 
Gasparini (1998) performs an analysis of the distributional impact of the 
tax system for 1996, taking per capita income and per capita consumption 
expenditures as welfare indicators. In the fi rst case, taxes are highly regres-
sive; meanwhile, when per capita consumption is considered, the incidence 
is moderately progressive. Gómez Sabaini, Santiere, and Rossignolo (2002) 
analyze the impact of taxes on income distribution for 1997, considering per 
capita income adjusted for underreporting as a welfare measure. The inci-
dence is regressive in this case, chiefl y because of VAT and indirect taxes.
Gómez Sabaini and Rossignolo (2009) consider the incidence of taxes 
for 2006, considering again per capita income adjusted for underreporting. 
Here, the impact of taxes is moderately progressive, mainly due to export taxes 
and the increase in the importance of Income Tax and Payroll taxes, measured 
by the Gini coeffi cient. However, since differences in extremes (that is, decile 
10 versus decile 1) increase, the authors determine that the system continues to 
have a regressive impact. Gómez Sabaini, Harriague, and Rossignolo (2013) 
arrive at similar conclusions with information on taxes for 2008.
SPE (2002) and SPER (1999) perform different estimations on pub-
lic expenditures for Argentina; their results show an unequivocal reduction 
in inequality. Gasparini (1999) arrives at similar results; benefi ts of public 
expenditures are received more strongly by lower income brackets.
In the case of poverty, several studies have analyzed the impact 
of specifi c programs on poverty reduction, such as Maurizio (2009), who 
explores the impact of different monetary transfers, and Marchionni et al. 
(2008), who examine the impact of simulated tariff schemes.
15
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The net effect of taxes and public expenditures on income distribution 
has been calculated in Gasparini (1999), SPE (2002), Gaggero and Rossign-
olo (2011), and Gómez Sabaini, Harriague and Rossignolo (2013), among 
others. Although the methodologies differ to a certain extent (one study 
considers a balanced budget; another effective tax collection), all the studies 
fi nd that the two highest income quintiles transfer resources to the lowest 
ones. Although the studies fi nd that the magnitude of the redistributional 
impact varies, all of them note a signifi cant equalizing effect. 
Following CEQ methodology, Lustig and Pessino (2013) assess 
the growing importance of noncontributory pensions in Argentina in the 
last decade, emphasizing the effect of government policies, such as the 
Asignación Universal por Hijo or the Moratoria Previsional through the 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares. This analysis used data from ENGHo 
2012-2013and from the tax side of the budget.
CEQ methodology calculates separately every fi scal intervention. 
Calculation of the effects of the different participations of public sector 
starts from considering Market Income as income from productive factors 
as the baseline income from which these policies operate. Two alternatives 
are considered; the Benchmark Case, in which pensions are considered as 
a part of Market Income, and a Sensitivity Analysis, in which said pen-
sions are considered as a public transfer. Net Market Income is obtained by 
subtracting direct taxes and social security contributions, and by adding up 
monetary transfers Disposable Income is obtained. Detracting indirect taxes 
and adding economic subsidies we arrive at Consumable Income; while by 
adding up health and education Final Income is obtained.
The analysis presented here differs from the above studies in that it 
measures the impact of taxes and spending combined not only on inequality 
but also poverty.  In addition, except in one case, the existing studies rely on 
information by decile rather than the entire distribution and except in one 
case, they do not include the analysis of price subsidies.  Another important 
difference is that existing studies which look at both taxes and expenditures 
assume a balanced budget and scale up the totals by decile to equal totals 
for the same items from budgetary data.  In contrast, following CEQ, in this 
study, totals were neither scaled up nor a balanced budget was assumed.  
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In economic terms, Argentina’s history has involved many crises and 
subsequent recoveries. The crisis that resulted from the termination of the 
currency board regime ended with a devaluation of the Argentine peso and a 
slump in economic activity (real GDP fell by 15.5% in 2001-2002) and with 
unemployment and poverty fi gures reaching high levels (unemployment 
climbed to 18.4% of the labor force, and 24.7% of the population suffered 
from extreme poverty in 2001).The process of economic recovery began 
in 2003: production, investment, consumption and employment all rose. 
Between 2004 and 2008, the GDP grew 8.4% annually. Between 2009 and 
2014, there have been periods of economic growth combined with decreases 
in GDP, such as in 2009, 2012 and 2014.
The Argentinean public sector is marked by a long history of struc-
tural imbalances. Figure 1 shows the progression of the primary and total 
surplus beginning in 2004. The public sector surplus declined from an aver-
age 2.8% of GDP between 2004 and 2008 to 0.4% between 2009 and 2013, 
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Figure 1: Taxes on Banking Transactions, Export Duties, Primary and Total 
Surplus in Argentina (2004-2014)
Source: Ministry of Economy and Public Finance.
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while the primary surplus represented a 1.4% average and a 1.1% average 
defi cit for the same periods. From 2009 on, budget surplus has been declining, 
with defi cits for both cases from 2012 on. 
The features of the tax policy implemented until the 2001 crisis were 
different from those of the past few years, when exceptional growth was 
achieved owing to the foreign sector and tax income. The fi scal surplus of 
the fi rst part of the decade was mainly due to tax revenues increasing at a 
greater rate than expenditures, which was not the case after 2011.
Argentina has experienced exceptional growth in tax burden in the 
last decade, reaching 32.5% of GDP in 2014.1 During these years, the country 
saw increasing tax-burden levels. This was partially due to the major impact 
of “extraordinary taxes”2 which represented  4.3% of GDP in 2008 (more 
than half of which resulted from export duties) and which, in 2010, decreased 
slightly but reached 4% of the GDP; elimination of the private-funded pension 
system also partially explains the rise in tax burden.
Additionally, sustained growth in tax collection from traditional tax-
ation (VAT, income tax and payroll taxes) confi rms the usual assumption 
that tax administration achievements are more effective during economy- 
recovery periods. 
The increase in tax burden in the last decade is related to the addi-
tion of taxes that were sporadically used in previous periods, such as export 
duties (withholdings) and current account debits and credits, and to other 
provisions that impacted Corporate and Personal Income Tax (no infl ation 
adjustments of fi nancial statements and thresholds). 
The lack of immediate adjustment of thresholds and tax brackets 
helped increase tax revenues from Personal Income Tax. This process, 
known as fi scal drag or "bracket creeping," is illustrated by the fact that in 
1997, almost 12.5% of taxable income was concentrated in the highest tax 
bracket, subject to the highest marginal tax rate; in 2011, that percentage 
was 58% (Gómez Sabaini and Rossignolo, 2014).
18
1. Gross Tax Burden, excluding reimbursements.
2. “Extraordinary taxes” comprise Current Account Credits and Debits and Export Duties.
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In 2008, Social Security contribution revenues gained importance, 
constituting the highest direct tax revenue source; resources from the elim-
inated capitalization system (implemented in the 1990s) were used by the 
government to establish the pay-as-you-go system.
On the expenditures side, public expenditures at all government 
levels have increased from 26% of GDP in 2004 to around 45% in 2013. 
The evolution of social expenditures in Argentina in the last decade can be 
divided in three stages (Gómez Sabaini, et al., 2013).
The fi rst stage stems from the socioeconomic crisis that the country 
experienced at the beginning of the last decade, which led to the creation of 
several emergency programs to ameliorate the impact of the crisis, including 
Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (PJyJHD); Programa Ingreso para 
el Desarrollo Humano (IDH), Programa Remediar in the health arena, and 
Programa de Emergencia Alimentaria (PEA) in the nutritional arena. 
In the second stage, between the economic recovery and the eco-
nomic crisis in 2008, more structural solutions were implemented, such as 
the Moratoria Previsional (a sort of "early retirement program" with a mora-
torium for those who do not complete the 30-year requirement),and the Ley 
de Financiamiento Educativo to increase education spending to 6% of GDP. 
Additionally, the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (PJyJHD) was 
divided in two components: Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social (PFIS) 
and Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo (SCE).
In the third stage, which started in 2008, the government’s main goal 
is to maintain income and employment at pre-crisis levels. To that end, the 
previously-mentioned elimination of the capitalization system led to the 
creation of the Sistema Integrado Previsional Argentino y Movilidad Jubi-
latoria (SIPA) and a mandated periodic increase in pensions. Additionally, 
the creation of a universal program, Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH), 
extended the benefi ts that formal workers receive related to the number of 
children they have to those in the informal sector and the unemployed. 
Aside from the increase in social expenditures, expenditures on eco-
nomic services, i.e. subsidies to tariffs, have increased greatly, averaging 
5% to 6% of GDP from 2012 to 2013. These expenditures were primarily 
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designed to prevent tariffs to services (mainly transportation and energy) 
from increasing in the area around greater Buenos Aires. 
IV. Iඇർංൽൾඇർൾ Aඇൺඅඒඌංඌ: Mൾඍඁඈൽඈඅඈ඀ංർൺඅ Nඈඍൾඌ
The main source of information for this report was the National 
Household Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Gastos de los Hoga-
res – ENGHo), conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 
– INDEC between March 2012 and February 2013. The ENGHo is a large-
scale survey that obtains detailed answers from about 20,960 households 
across the country (around 36.1 million total inhabitants). The ENGHo is a 
representative sample of 86.8% of the population. A percentage of the urban 
population and rural towns with fewer than 5000 inhabitants were excluded 
from the sample due to high administrative costs (INDEC, 2012). 
The main survey variables used in this study are household expend-
iture and income. In order to defi ne and analyze different domains and de-
pict the households they include, the survey also contains information on 
demographic, occupational and educational variables, as well as housing 
characteristics, transfers in kind received and household goods. 
The incidence analysis to which most studies refer is the so called 
"differential incidence", which is carried out utilizing methodology applied 
in the equilibrium economic analysis. Two approaches can be mentioned 
here: on one hand, partial equilibrium analysis, in which a particular market 
is considered separately and the effects of changes in taxes or public ex-
penditures are analyzed within that market. 
On the other hand, incidence in a general equilibrium framework, 
in which all effects, direct and indirect, are taken into account. Here, sec-
ond round effects are calculated for a general equilibrium framework but 
are disregarded in a partial equilibrium analysis. these indirect effects may 
introduce differences between equity effects resulting from both methodol-
ogies. Partial equilibrium analysis is however more useful when evaluating 
the effect of specifi c policy measures because the disaggregation used in the 
required data is much higher.
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4.  Lustig and Pessino (2013) analyze the sustainability of redistributional policies applied in 
Argentina. 
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The incidence analysis performed in this paper, consistent with the 
partial equilibrium literature, is the accounting approach, which tries to ac-
count for who pays the taxes to the state. In some cases, that information 
may be obtained directly from sample surveys, although some inference 
may be necessary;  taxes may not be directly observed in surveys and may 
have to be fi gured out indirectly. According to Bourguignon and da Silva 
(2003), indirect methods involve applying offi cial income tax schedules or 
imputing indirect taxes paid through observed spending.
Accounting approaches, however, ignore possible behavioral re-
sponses by agents that may modify the amounts they actually pay or receive; 
an accounting approach would not detect tax evasion, for example, result-
ing from an increase in income tax rates. These approaches are limited to 
fi rst-round effects and do not consider second-round effects attributable to 
behavioral responses, which behavioral approaches try to take into account. 
The methodology used here to estimate the incidence of taxes and 
expenditures adopts different assumptions about the shifting of the tax bur-
den because, in most cases, the person liable for the tax or the person entitled 
to receiving the benefi t is not the person who ultimately bears the tax burden 
or effectively gets an increase in their income. Both sellers and buyers may 
adapt to the tax by shifting it in accordance with its different elasticities: 
the smaller the (offer or demand) elasticity, the smaller the possibility of 
shifting the tax and the higher the impact on the person bearing the burden.
Therefore, there are various alternatives for measuring the impact of 
taxes and estimating their incidence. In this study, as in the majority of stud-
ies based on a partial equilibrium framework, it is assumed that the burden 
generated by taxes on goods and services is fully shifted to consumers via a 
higher price. Even though this seems to be the most widely used method for 
approximating the compensating variation, there are some inherent diffi cul-
ties in establishing these kinds of hypotheses and, more importantly, some 
defects in other assignment mechanisms that should not be ignored (Sahn 
and Younger, 2003). 
This study assumes no tax evasion in general, which means that all 
the people due to pay taxes, according to their incomes or consumption 
expenditure behavior, bear the tax burden. However, if purchases have been 
made in the informal market, it is assumed that no taxes have been paid. 
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In order to account for the incidence of direct taxes, it is commonly 
assumed that the burden of PIT and other taxes related to income falls on the 
person required to pay them (income earner), i.e. the economic incidence is 
the same as the statutory incidence. For Corporate Income Tax and Social 
Security contributions, the incidence assumption is not so straightforward. 
A general equilibrium model is necessary to account for the fi nal incidence; 
specifi cally, for Social Security, how much of the burden is borne by em-
ployers and employees, and for CIT, how much is borne by capital owners 
or employers and how much is transferred on to consumers via a higher 
price. The latter is diffi cult to account for in a household survey, but the 
former can be calculated if it is assumed that the tax is completely borne by 
employees through a reduced salary. Consequently, CIT has been left aside.4 
Due not only to the absence of relevant information (mainly data 
related to the decrease in disposable income of the producers once export 
taxes have been collected) but also to the different economic effects out-
side the scope of a standard, exclusively fi scal incidence analysis, export 
duties, which represented 2.3% of GDP in 2012, have been excluded from 
this analysis. Gómez Sabaini and Rossignolo (2009), and Gómez Sabaini, 
Harriague, and Rossignolo (2014), following a different methodology than 
the one used here, conclude that these taxes are progressive following the 
standard Gini and concentration coeffi cients.5
Information on direct taxes is rarely gathered directly by surveys; 
instead, surveys report earnings. Depending on the source of income, the 
amount reported is usually, though not always, after taxes. Salaried workers 
in the formal sector report income after taxes. For informal salaried work-
ers, employers, independent workers, capital income earners, social security 
benefi ciaries and people receiving pensions and transfers, reported income 
refl ects earnings before taxes. To get at the tax burden, tax revenues should 
be computed from all these income sources, assuming that they are taxable 
income. 
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4. These criteria are usual in the literature. However, if, for instance, CIT incidence were calculated, it 
could be the case that its incidence were borne by company owners (shifted backwards) or passed 
though to consumers via a higher price. Tax incidence would be progressive in the fi rst case and 
regressive in the second.
5. Other taxes that were excluded from the analysis were taxes on banking transactions (1.7% of 
GDP) and taxes on property (1.3% of GDP) due to lack of relevant information in the survey. 
Gómez Sabaini and Rossignolo (2009) estimates show that the fi rst are regressive while the se-
cond are progressive.
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On the expenditure side, it is assumed that the benefi ciaries of a pro-
gram are the users and their families who receive free or subsidized public 
provisions. This assumption means that the potential benefi ts that could ac-
crue to production factors are ignored, as are the externalities that may arise 
from the consumption of publicly provided goods (ideally, the equivalent 
variation for every individual would be calculated to assess the complete 
incidence).
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This section explains the characteristics of the taxes and expenditures 
analyzed in this study. The indirect taxes considered were the Value Added 
Tax, excise taxes, fuel taxes and the provincial turnover tax; the direct taxes 
analyzed were Personal Income Tax, payroll taxes and other minimum taxes 
on income ("Monotributo"). These taxes represent about 71% of total tax 
revenues (national and provincial) for 2012; of that 71%, 80% could be 
simulated with the estimations provided here.
On the expenditure side, we have classifi ed the Asignación Univer-
sal por Hijo as the fl agship cash program. The Plan de Inclusión Previsional 
y Moratoria Previsional has been included in the Noncontributory Pensions 
category. In Other Cash and Near Cash Transfers, the programs Asigna-
ciones Familiares, Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo, Programa Familias 
por la Inclusión Social, Becas Universitarias, Programa Jóvenes con Más 
y Mejor Trabajo, Seguro de Desempleo and Comedores Escolares y Co-
munitarios are included. Total public expenditures on education and health 
represent about 76% of total social expenditures, rising to 83% when Con-
tributory Pensions are counted as a public transfer in 2012; these estima-
tions account for about 62% of social expenditures estimated in this study. 
Economic subsidies to transportation, electricity and gas services have also 
been calculated. Table 1 presents the aggregate fi gures for taxes and public 
expenditures as percentage of GDP (2012).
Due to discrepancies in the offi cial Argentine statistics for the cal-
culation of GDP, all calculations that involved the association of nominal 
values with values in the survey were "scaled down" by 22% to attempt to 
account for the difference in GDP calculated with year base 1993 and GDP 
with year base 2004.
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Government Spending and Revenue Percentage of GDP
Total Government Spending 44,1
Social Spending (excludes contrib pensions) 20,9
Direct Transfers (Total Cash & Near Cash Transfers) 5,8
Flagship Cash or Near Cash Transfer program 0,5
Noncontributory Pensions 2,9
Other Cash and Near Cash Transfers 2,4
Total In-kind Transfers 13,1
Education 7,4
Basic (primary and secondary) 7,5
Tertiary and University 4,6
Science, culture and education non discriminated 1,5
Health 5,6
Contributory 3,2
Noncontributory 2,5
Housing and Urban 0,6
Other Social Spending 1,3
Contributory Pensions 7,1
Non-Social Spending 14,1
Indirect Subsidies 5,9
Agriculture 0,3
Energy, fuel and mining 2,6
Industry 0,1
Transportation 2,4
Communication 0,2
Other indirect subsidies 0,3
Other Non-Social Spending 8,2
Debt Servicing
Interest payments 2,1
Total Tax Revenue 32,7
Direct Taxes 2,2
Personal Income Tax 2,1
                   Simplifi ed Tax Regime (Monotributo) 0,1
VAT and Other Indirect Taxes 12,3
     Other Taxes 18,1
of which Social Security Contributions with Pensions 8,8
Table 1: Government Spending and Revenue Structure 
in % of GDP 2012
Source:  Author´s calculations based on information from the Ministry of 
Economy and Public Finance.
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5.1. Indirect Taxes
Value Added Tax (VAT): VAT is a consumption tax on all stages of 
the production and distribution of goods and services. It is not cumulative 
and uses the “tax against tax” system, where the balance between tax credits 
(charged to sales) and tax debits (charged to purchases) is paid to the seller 
every month. This procedure is equivalent to applying the tax on the value 
added at every elaboration stage. It is levied on imports in a similar way to 
domestic production, but exports are zero rated. 
The general tax rate is 21%. There are few exemptions because most 
have been eliminated in successive reforms.6 There are also differential 
rates: the highest is 27% on the invoices of public services provided to com-
panies that are liable for the tax; the lowest is 10.5% on new home sales and 
a very limited list of goods and services.7,8 
Excise taxes (Impuestos internos): These taxes apply to the domestic 
sale and import of a specifi c list of goods and transactions: alcoholic bever-
ages (20%), beer (8%), soft drinks and other nonalcoholic beverages (4% to 
8%), automobiles and diesel engines (10%), and insurance (2.5%).
For all taxes on goods, the taxable basis includes the tax itself. The 
taxable basis is the net price billed by the responsible party, defi ned as the re-
mainder after deduction of discounts and bonuses, fi nancing interest, and the 
VAT generated by the operation. In the case of cigarettes, the taxable basis 
is the sale price to the end user, excluding the VAT; in the case of insurance, 
the taxable basis does not include the tax itself, which is the only case in 
domestic taxes where the legal or nominal rate is applied to the taxable basis.
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6. Among exemptions with considerable tax collection importance in 2012 were books, brochures 
and similar printed material, natural ordinary water, milk without additives, buyers who are 
end consumers or tax-exempt individuals, medicines, goods at the resale stage and for which 
the tax has been paid at the import or manufacturer’s stage, theater performances, international 
passenger and cargo transportation, and life insurance.
7. The lowest tax rate includes some basic foods (meat, fruit, vegetables, bread), newspapers, maga-
zines and periodical publications, goods at the selling stage to the general public, and domestic 
transportation services for passengers by land, water, or air, except for taxis and rental car ser-
vices on routes less than 100 km.
8. In the case of exempt goods, the 1997 Input / Output table was used, with data from 1993. The 
taxable input proportion was estimated for each exempt good: the incidence of taxable inputs 
was estimated for the sales amount of exempt goods, and the same structure was applied to the 
total of VAT purchases deriving from the consumption of exempt goods.
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Fuel tax: In 2012, liquid fuel and natural compressed gas were taxed 
(62% to 70%). Among fuels, the tax is applied to all forms of gasoline: 
solvent, turpentine, gas oil, diesel oil and kerosene. For gas, the tax falls on 
compressed natural gas for motor vehicles, distributed through pipelines. 
The tax must be applied in a single circulation stage for the sale of national 
or imported products. Importers of liquid fuel and companies that refi ne or 
market it are subject to the fuel tax, as are distributors of gas before it enters 
the pipeline.
The tax is calculated by applying the corresponding rate to the net 
sales price listed on the invoice or similar document for resellers at the dis-
patching plant, issued by the persons liable for its payment.9 
Provincial Turnover Tax: This tax is an important source of revenue 
for the sub national governments and is applied by all provinces. It is a 
cascade tax because it falls on all stages of production and distribution of 
goods and services. It taxes gross income without deducting the tax already 
paid and cumulated through previous purchases in the production process. 
Because it forces vertical integration of fi rms and discriminates in favor 
of imports which do not contain taxes paid on every production stage, the 
provincial turnover tax alters neutrality.
Tax rates follow similar patterns across the country; however, rates 
vary highly due to differences in economic activities and corresponding ju-
risdictions. In general, the highest rates appear in Commerce and Services; 
intermediate rates are applied to Industrial activities, and the lowest rates 
occur in the Primary sector.
In order to calculate tax incidence, the aforementioned tax rates were 
applied to the data on consumption reported in the household survey. Ac-
cording to several authors including Rossignolo(2015)10,  effective tax rates 
are at least twice as high as rates on fi nal consumption; consequently, rates 
on retail consumption have increased 150% in order to account for the taxes 
included at every production stage for every province. The methodology 
  9. Alternatively, although there is no reliable study in Argentina determining the percentage of fuel 
cost that is part of the transportation cost transferred to the consumer, at present, and basically 
due to the existence of transportation and fuel subsidies distorting relative values, we assumed 
that 30% of the tax is transferred.
10. Rossignolo (2015) presents a calculation of the effective rate of this tax.
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applied is the same as that for VAT and excise taxes; since the tax base 
excludes VAT, excises and fuel tax, this tax is the closest to input costs and 
should be included in the tax base of the previously mentioned taxes.
V.2. Direct Taxes
Personal Income Tax: PIT is a global type tax, structured with pro-
gressive rates; its taxable base has been expanded by several pieces of leg-
islation. The Income Tax Act delineates four categories of income based on 
their source (land rent, capital gains, company and certain business brokers’ 
income, and personal income). A single taxpayer may generate income corre-
sponding to one or more income categories at the same time. The calculation of 
the taxable income is based on the income and expenses corresponding to the 
four categories and on the participating interests in companies or activities.11 
The tax is determined by taxable net income bracket, based on a 
sliding scale consisting of a fi xed amount plus a rate increasing from 9% to 
35% on the excess of each income bracket bottom level. Individuals paying 
income tax fall into one of the two following categories: self-employed tax-
payers or salaried workers. Self-employed taxpayers (that is, independent 
workers registered as income tax payers) must pay income tax each fi scal 
year in fi ve bi-monthly advance payments. 
Other income taxes ("Monotributo"): One group of taxpayers, re-
ferred to here as small taxpayers, is subject to a simplifi ed tax regime called 
Monotributo. This regime replaces the Income Tax and Value Added Tax 
with a single fi xed-amount monthly tax plus contributions for Social Se-
curity and Health Insurance. Under this regime, the single tax payment is 
based on an income bracket and no further rules related to the assessment of 
income, deductions for dependents or special deductions are applied.
The tax levied is a fi xed amount established according to the 
Monotributo category into which taxpayers fall. These categories are deter-
11. There are numerous subjective and objective exemptions. The most important among the latter 
are those on interest accrued on saving accounts deposits, special saving accounts and term depo-
sits, income derived from securities, shares, bonds, bills of exchange, notes and other securities 
issued or to be issued in the future by a governmental authority, the rental value of the residence 
when occupied by its owners, etc. The following items are not exempt: pensions, retirement 
payments, subsidies, and salaries received during medical leave.
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mined based on invoicing and/or the surface area of the facilities and/or the 
use of power during production. 
Payroll taxes: As a part of the tax system, taxes on wages were 
analyzed, including contributions made by both the employee and the em-
ployer. In both cases, the amount collected is deposited into the Federal Tax 
Administration and that revenue is distributed according to the correspond-
ing legal provisions.
For formal sector employees, the items considered are  contributions 
to the social security system (11%), health insurance (3%), and the national 
pensions fund (3%), up to a ceiling of AR$ 21,248 monthly (maximum tax-
able base). This amounts to a total rate of 17%.
In the case of employers, the items considered are contributions to 
the social security system (12.71%), health insurance (6%), the national 
pension fund (1.62%), the fund for family allowances (5.56%) and the na-
tional employment fund (1.11%), which amounts to 27% of earnings in the 
formal sector. This rate pertains to employers whose activity is concentrated 
in the services sector; for other employers, the rate is 23%.
In the case of independent workers, the items considered are their 
contributions to the social security system (27%) and the national pensions 
fund (5%). These rates are applied to a scaled tax base that is progressive 
and differs between professionals and traders. These workers have been 
identifi ed in the household survey by years of education.
V.3. Flagship Cash or Near Cash Transfer programs
Asignación Universal por Hijo
Target population: Parents with dependent children under the age of 
18 who are informal workers with an income lower than the minimum sala-
ry of the formal sector, unemployed people without unemployment benefi ts, 
or domestic service workers. 
Targeting mechanism: A monthly monetary transfer of AR$ 270 per 
child in 2012, raised to AR$ 340 in September 2012. Benefi ts are received 
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for each of up to fi ve children. The fi rst 80% of the benefi t is received by 
direct deposit into a bank account; the remaining 20% is transferred with 
proof that the children are attending school and have received the compul-
sory vaccines. This benefi t includes a means testing mechanism in the sense 
that benefi ciaries cannot receive other social benefi ts while receiving Asig-
nación Universal por Hijo.
V.4. Non-contributory Pensions
Pension Moratorium (Moratoria Previsional) and the Early Retirement 
Program (Jubilacion Anticipada)
Target population: In 2005, the government instituted an early re-
tirement program through a moratorium for those who had not completed 
30years of service (Pension Moratorium (Moratoria Previsional). In 2007, 
a program that allowed workers who had completed the required 30years of 
service but who were at least fi ve years younger than the offi cial retirement 
age(65 for men, 60 for women) to receive the pension (Jubilación Anticipa-
da) was also instituted.
Targeting mechanism: For the Jubilación Anticipada, the transfer is 
equivalent to 50% of the corresponding benefi t that the person would be 
entitled to receive at full retirement age, although it cannot be lower than 
the minimum pension. For the Prestación por Moratoria, the benefi ciaries 
receive their transfer net of a reduction that corresponds to the number of 
years the person has not contributed to the system. As years of contribution 
cannot be established in this paper, the program simulated here compensates 
the pensioners who are receiving a lower-than-minimum pension in order to 
reach the minimum threshold.
V.5. Other Cash and Near Cash Transfers
Asignaciones Familiares
Target population: Salaried workers in the formal sector who have 
children up to 18 years of age and salaries under the limit as well as pen-
sioners and unemployment compensation benefi ciaries with children under 
18. The program covers marriage, children, adoption, disabled children, 
29Tඁൾ Iආඉൺർඍ ඈൿ Tൺඑൾඌ ൺඇൽ Eඑඉൾඇൽංඍඎඋൾඌ ඈඇ Pඈඏൾඋඍඒ ...
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ |Vඈඅ. LIV | N° 1 | 2016 | ඉඉ. 13 - 58 | ISSN 0034-8066 | ൾ-ISSN 2451-7321
30 Dൺඋටඈ Rඈඌඌං඀ඇඈඅඈ 
among other monthly transfers, and school attendance for children, paid 
once a year.
Targeting mechanism: Formal salaried workers receive their benefi ts 
according to their income level and to the number of benefi ciaries they de-
clare. For instance, the fi xed amount for every child in June 2012 was AR$ 
270 if the worker’s salary was between AR$100 and AR$ 2.800; the amount 
decreased to AR$ 204 for a salary between AR$ 2.800 and AR$ 4.000, and 
to AR$ 136 for a salary between AR$ 4.000 and AR$ 5.200. These amounts 
varied by geographical zone, being higher in the southern region of the 
country. A household might be excluded from this benefi t in the absence of 
either children or a head of household working in the formal sector, if the 
head of household is retired or unemployed and receiving unemployment 
benefi ts, or if the head of household is earning an income higher than the 
maximum allowed for the benefi t (AR$ 5.200 per month in 2012).
Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo
Target population: Benefi ciaries of the previous Programa Jefes y 
Jefas de Hogar, including those with greater employment prospects.
Targeting mechanism: The benefi ciaries of the Jefes y Jefas de 
Hogar Program, which was created in 2002 to ameliorate effects of rising 
unemployment through an initial monthly transfer of AR$ 150, were divided 
in two groups according to their employment potential. Those considered 
more "employable" were assigned to the Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo, 
a 24-month monetary transfer of AR$ 225 for the fi rst 18 months and AR$ 
200 for the remaining six months. The benefi ciaries must comply with regu-
lations such as attending courses to increase their employment skills
Programa Familias por la Inclusión Social
Target population: The benefi ciaries of the previous Programa Jefes 
y Jefas de Hogar, including those with fewer employment prospects.
Targeting mechanism: The benefi ciaries of the Jefes y Jefas de Hog-
ar Program, which was created in 2002 to ameliorate effects of rising unem-
ployment through an initial monthly transfer of AR$ 150, were divided in 
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two groups according to their employment potential. Those considered less 
"employable" were assigned to the Programa Familias por la Inclusión So-
cial, which is received according to the number of dependent children under 
age 18, from two to six children. The benefi t starts at AR$ 155 per child and 
increases to AR$ 380 for six children or more for families below the poverty 
line. The program is not compatible with other transfers.
Becas Universitarias
Target population: PNBU (Programa Nacional de Becas Universitar-
ias) is for university students attending an offi cially recognized program of 
any national university; it excludes students in their last year of study and 
those planning to start their careers.
Targeting mechanism: Beginning in 2009, students have received 
AR$ 3000 in 10 installments throughout the year. There are other two 
compensation programs, Programa de Becas Bicentenario, for students pre-
paring for scientifi c careers, and Programa Nacional de Becas de Grado, 
for students of information technology. This study might overestimate the 
amount received because it cannot establish which program the benefi ciaries 
are studying.
Programa Jóvenes con Más y Mejor Trabajo
Target population: People between 18 and 24 years of age who nei-
ther work nor study.
Targeting mechanism: The benefi ciaries must be unemployed, with 
incomplete primary or secondary education, and between 18 and 24 years of 
age. The amount of the transfer is AR$ 150 a month for 2 to18 months; in 
addition, transfers are made against the presentation of a project for which 
the benefi ciary receives AR$ 4,000 per project.
Seguro de Desempleo
Target population: Workers who have lost their jobs through no fault 
of their own and have been unemployed for at least 36 months.
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ |Vඈඅ. LIV | N° 1 | 2016 | ඉඉ. 13 - 58 | ISSN 0034-8066 | ൾ-ISSN 2451-7321
32 Dൺඋටඈ Rඈඌඌං඀ඇඈඅඈ 
Targeting mechanism:  A transfer of between AR$ 250 and AR$ 400, 
calculated as a percentage of the highest previous salary. Maximum coverage 
lasts one year.
Comedores Escolares y Comunitarios
Target population: Schools, clubs, etc., that serve meals to children 
or the unemployed.
Targeting mechanism: Monetary transfer related to the cost of milk or 
a basic food basket provided to feed children or adults below the poverty line.
V.6. Economic Subsidies
Subsidies to economic sectors are directed to transportation, com-
munications, energy and fuel, industry and agriculture, and other sectors. 
The most important subsidies are those for transportation, energy and fuel; 
transportation subsidies are mainly oriented to supply, whereas energy and 
fuel are oriented to both supply and demand. Subsidies to energy include 
fuel, gas and electricity; subsidies to transportation comprise tariffs for trains, 
subways, airplanes and buses. 
After having been a net exporter of fuel in the 1990s and at the be-
ginning of the 2000s, Argentina has become a net importer of fuel. The 
price of the imported gas oil is subsidized through a fi duciary fund, and 
the consumer receives the difference between the price of fuel within the 
internal market and the same product at international prices. 
For gas, there are two kinds of subsidy: for those who receive gas 
through a pipeline, the subsidy is included in the reduced cost of imported 
gas, which is included in the tariff. Those who buy bottled gas pay a sub-
sidized price in which the government gives the producers the difference 
between the market price and the subsidized price. The total amount paid 
varies depending on the volume of the previous year’s gas consumption.
 For electricity, a fi duciary fund has been created to subsidize tariffs 
for households. The subsidy depends on the volume of the previous year’s 
electricity consumption. 
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V.7. Education and Health
In 2006,the National Education Law was passed following the Edu-
cation Financing Law, which extended compulsory education to the end of 
secondary school. Data show that when compulsory education is extended, 
attendance increases but that students also continue to drop out at the same 
ages as before the law was passed (Gómez Sabaini, Harriague and Rossign-
olo, 2013).
There are two educational systems at every level: a free, public edu-
cation system, and a private system, which is subsidized. Primary education 
is managed by the municipalities, secondary education is the responsibility 
of the provinces, and university is administered at a national level (with 
several exceptions at all levels). The public education system serves the 
majority of students, accounting for 73% of total students in 2012, of which 
28.2% are enrolled in primary public schools. Public universities enroll 79% 
of university students. The results for the distributional impact of education 
aggregate expenditures for Basic Education, including initial, primary and 
secondary school, and Superior (universities and tertiary).12 
The Argentine health system is split into several parts because different 
population groups access different providers. One component of health insur-
ance provides coverage for the population dependent on formal wage earners 
or retired pensioners. Populations that are not covered have access to the pub-
lic health system; high income population has access to the private system.
For formal workers, health benefi ts are delivered mainly through 
health insurance systems of trade unions, for both the private and public 
sectors as well at national and provincial levels. These workers comprise 
the greatest share of the benefi ciaries. Pensioners are covered by the health 
insurance system known as INSSJyP (PAMI), a subsystem that fi nances pri-
vate health service providers. The public health system covers those who do 
not have health insurance.
It is worth noting that the population covered by the private system 
can also receive public system benefi ts. Public expenditures for health have 
risen to 5.4% of GDP, 2.4% of which belong to health insurance systems. 
12. For each educational level, the results for public and private subsidized education can be shown 
and are available from the author upon request.
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Low complexity hospitals were decentralized to the provinces and munic-
ipalities in the 1990s, while the high complexity ones still remain under 
federal administration.
VI. Eඑඉൾඇൽංඍඎඋൾඌ, Tൺඑൾඌ, Iඇൾඊඎൺඅංඍඒ ൺඇൽ Pඈඏൾඋඍඒ Rൾൽඎർඍංඈඇ 
ංඇ Aඋ඀ൾඇඍංඇൺ: Mൺංඇ Rൾඌඎඅඍඌ
This section presents several results of the CEQ analysis of the im-
pact of taxes and public spending on poverty and inequality in Argentina. 
The main results will focus on the "benchmark case", in which pensions are 
a part of market income, while results from the "sensitivity analysis", where 
pensions are treated as a government transfer, are available from the author 
upon request . It can be seen, however, that when pensions are considered a 
government transfer, the impact in the reduction of inequality and poverty 
is markedly higher.
VI.1. Impact on Inequality and Poverty
The evolution of the Gini coeffi cient,  headcount ratio and poverty 
gap (using the international poverty lines of US$2.50 PPP and US$4 PPP 
per day and the national moderate poverty lines) are presented in Table 2.
Market 
Income
Net Market 
Income
Disposable 
Income
Consumable 
Income
Final 
Income
Gini 0,481 0,435 0,403 0,401 0,303
Headcount index
$2.5 PPP 4,7% 5,1% 1,8% 3,0%
$4 PPP 12,3% 13,9% 7,3% 12,5%
National Moderate PL (INDEC) 10,3% 12,0% 5,6% 9,7%
Other Moderate PL (FIEL) 28,8% 33,1% 28,4% 37,8%
Poverty Gap
$2.5 PPP 1,8% 1,9% 0,5% 0,8%
$4 PPP 4,2% 4,7% 1,8% 3,3%
National Moderate PL (INDEC) 3,6% 4,0% 1,4% 2,5%
Other Moderate PL (FIEL) 11,6% 13,1% 8,6% 13,0%
Table 2: Gini and Headcount Index for Different Income Concepts
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHඈ.
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Market income Gini is higher than the net market income Gini, indi-
cating that direct taxes (Personal Income Tax, Social Security Contributions 
and Monotributo) reduce inequality. Regarding poverty, however, the effect 
is the inverse, because a reduction in income due to direct taxes (mainly, in 
this case, Monotributo), results in a higher number of households lying below 
the poverty line. When direct transfers are included in disposable income, re-
ductions in both inequality and poverty are evident; disposable income Gini 
declines around 16% and extreme poverty falls by 61% (Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 2a: Evolution of inequality through different income concepts. 
Gini coeffi cient.
Figure 2b: Evolution of inequality through different income concepts. 
Percent change in Gini 
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
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Consumable income includes the net effect of indirect taxes and eco-
nomic subsidies. The high impact of the latter reduces poverty and more than 
compensates for the inequalizing effect of taxes; poverty increases because 
indirect taxes lie more heavily on low income consumers. The reduction in 
poverty and inequality is further propelled by in-kind transfers in education 
and health, as shown when calculating the Gini index with fi nal income: the 
fi nal income Gini (compared to the market income Gini) declines by 37%. 
Figure 3a: Evolution of poverty through different income concepts.
Headcount index
Figure 3b: Evolution of poverty through different income concepts.
Percent change in Headcount index 
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
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VI.2. Coverage and Effectiveness of Direct, In-kind Transfers and Indi-
rect Subsidies
Table 3 presents indicators that measure the extent to which direct 
transfers are effective and effi cient in reducing poverty using both inter-
national and national poverty lines. These indicators express a measure of 
"productivity" of direct transfers and public expenditure. The effectiveness 
Benchmark Case
(national accounts)
Inequality 
Change in Gini (direct transfers) 0,58
Poverty
Change in Headcount Index ($1.25 PPP per day) 0,20
Change in Poverty Gap ($1.25 PPP per day) 0,11
Change in Squared Poverty Gap ($1.25 PPP per day) 0,08
Change in Headcount Index ($2.50 PPP per day) 0,58
Change in Headcount Index ($4 PPP per day) 1,20
$2.50 PPP per day
Vertical Expenditure Effi ciency 0,11
Poverty Reduction Effi ciency 0,04
Spillover Index 0,62
Poverty Gap Effi ciency 0,71
$4.00 PPP per day
Vertical Expenditure Effi ciency 0,31
Poverty Reduction Effi ciency 0,14
Spillover Index 0,55
Poverty Gap Effi ciency 0,62
National Extreme PL
Vertical Expenditure Effi ciency 0,05
Poverty Reduction Effi ciency 0,02
Spillover Index 0,67
Poverty Gap Effi ciency 0,78
National Moderate PL
Vertical Expenditure Effi ciency 0,28
Poverty Reduction Effi ciency 0,11
Spillover Index 0,60
Poverty Gap Effi ciency 0,64
Table 3: Poverty Reduction Effi ciency and Effectiveness 
Indicators of Direct Transfers 
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
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indicator is defi ned as the effect on inequality (or on poverty) of the trans-
fers being analyzed divided by their relative size (as a percent of GDP); i.e., 
how much Gini or poverty indicators are reduced due to direct transfers as a 
percent of GDP. As shown, Gini falls signifi cantly (0.58 percentage points); 
moderate poverty ($4 PPP per day) falls by 1.20 percentage points due to 
Direct transfers. 
The Vertical Expenditure Effi ciency (VEE) indicator measures the 
amount of direct transfers that go to the poor. This indicator shows that 
11% of direct transfers reach the extreme poor while 31% of direct trans-
fers reach the total poor population (using international poverty lines). The 
spillover index (S) indicates how much of the spending that reached the 
poor was in excess of the strictly necessary amount required for the benefi -
ciaries to reach the poverty line. As shown, the spillovers are high (62% for 
the extreme poor and 55% for total poor population). 
The Poverty Reduction Effi ciency (PRE) indicator is the product 
of VEE times S. Finally, the Poverty Gap Effi ciency (PGE) measures the 
transfers’ effectiveness in reducing the poverty gap. PGE estimates indicate 
that direct transfers are more effi cient in reducing extreme poverty gaps 
than in reducing total poverty gaps (71% for extreme poor and 62% for total 
poor population).
Table 4 shows coverage levels and distribution of benefi ts for every 
disaggregated area of public spending. The table shows that Asignación 
Universal por Hijo, Programa Familias and Moratoria Previsional (and hos-
pitals, among in-kind transfers) are the programs most targeted to reducing 
extreme poverty. Meanwhile, superior education and indirect subsidies 
concentrate their benefi ts more heavily on the non-poor (that is, those who 
exceed the $4 PPP per day line).
VI.3. Incidence Analysis
Incidence analysis has been calculated through the ratio of benefi ts 
to market income by market income deciles. The effect of direct taxes and 
direct transfers leads to a reduction in inequality; the highest decile by mar-
ket income ranking is the one that bears the highest proportion of direct 
taxes. Meanwhile, in the case of direct transfers, the effect is the inverse, 
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Benchmark scenario Groups:
y < 2.5 2.5 < y < 4 y > 4
Health-Hospitals 14,7% 15,5% 69,8%
Health-Contributory 1,0% 3,8% 95,2%
Health-Contributory - elderly -INSSJyP 2,3% 4,8% 93,0%
Education-Basic 5,6% 8,6% 85,8%
Education-Tertiary and Universitary 0,4% 1,3% 98,2%
Transportation 1,1% 2,6% 96,2%
Subsidies on bus tariffs 1,5% 3,0% 95,5%
Subsidies on train tariffs 1,0% 2,8% 96,2%
Subsidies on subway tariffs 0,0% 1,8% 98,2%
Subsidies on airplane tariffs 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
Electricity 2,3% 3,2% 94,5%
Gas red 0,8% 1,1% 98,1%
Gas "Garrafa social" 3,5% 8,1% 88,4%
Gas total 1,1% 1,9% 97,0%
Combustibles directo 0,1% 0,2% 99,7%
Combustibles indirecto 2,0% 3,0% 95,0%
Asignaciones Familiares 2,9% 6,6% 90,5%
Asignación Universal por Hijo 16,2% 21,7% 62,1%
Plan de Inclusión Previsional y Moratoria 
Previsional
12,2% 22,5% 65,2%
Seguro de capacitación y empleo 4,1% 2,8% 93,1%
Programa Familias por la Inclusión Social 20,1% 36,7% 43,1%
Becas universitarias 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
Programa jóvenes con más y mejor trabajo 3,3% 4,0% 92,7%
Seguro de desempleo 7,4% 15,6% 77,1%
Comedores escolares y comunitarios 7,2% 14,6% 78,2%
Direct Cash Transfers 10,6% 18,4% 71,0%
Total Non-contributory pensions 12,2% 22,5% 65,2%
Total Contributory Pensions 0,5% 1,2% 98,3%
Total Education Spending 4,3% 6,9% 88,8%
Total Health Spending 6,8% 8,7% 84,5%
Total CEQ Social Spending 6,4% 9,6% 84,0%
Income shares 0,3% 0,9% 98,8%
Population shares 4,1% 6,0% 89,9%
Table 4: Coverage and Distribution of Benefi ts and Benefi ciaries by Program
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
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since the lowest market income deciles receive the highest proportion of 
transfers.
Indirect taxes show that the lowest market income deciles pay a 
higher proportion of their market income in taxes; this effect is partially 
mitigated by the indirect subsidies. In-kind transfers (health and education) 
fall heavily on the lowest market income deciles (Table 5).
VI.4. Progressivity
Figure 4 presents social spending by program analyzed, total social 
spending, and indirect expenditures, sorted by their degree of progressivity, 
measured by the concentration coeffi cient. 
The idea here is to show how concentrated are the benefi ts among the 
benefi ciaries, based on the initial ranking of individuals. It is computation-
ally equivalent to a Gini coeffi cient but without reranking of individuals (it 
is also called "Quasi-Gini"). Consequently, their results should be compared 
with initial Gini coeffi cient in order to determine whether expenditures are 
progressive in absolute, relative terms, or regressive. Those expenditures 
that show a negative concentration coeffi cient are progressive in absolute 
terms (pro-poor), while those with a positive sign are progressive in relative 
terms but not in absolute terms (pro-rich). The concentration coeffi cient for 
social spending shows progressivity in absolute terms (a pro-poor charac-
teristic). 
Most direct cash transfers, education expenditures, and health ben-
efi ts are progressive in absolute terms; it is worth noting that spending in 
tertiary and university education is pro-rich as it benefi ts more, in absolute 
terms, households that are wealthier than those that are poorer. This result 
coincides with other studies (Gómez Sabaini, Harriague, and Rossignolo, 
2013). However, expenditures that are regressive in absolute terms (pro-
rich) are dominated by indirect subsidies, i.e., public transfers designed to 
keep tariffs low. Transportation, electricity and gas are among these ex-
penditures, because richer households receive a higher benefi t in absolute 
terms than low income individuals do (Figure 4). 
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Income distribution by decile is presented in Table 6. For instance, 
the fi rst decile concentrates 1.2% of market income. After government inter-
vention, the fi rst decile concentrates 3.9% of fi nal income. The richest decile 
concentrates 35.7% of market income; taxes and public expenditures reduce 
its share to 27.3% of fi nal income.
Decile
Benchmark case
Market 
Income
Net Market 
Income
Disposable 
Income
Consumable 
Income
Final 
Income
1 1,2% 1,5% 2,1% 2,1% 3,9%
2 2,4% 2,8% 3,4% 3,3% 5,0%
3 3,6% 4,0% 4,4% 4,4% 5,8%
4 4,8% 5,3% 5,5% 5,5% 6,5%
5 6,2% 6,7% 6,9% 6,7% 7,4%
6 7,6% 8,2% 8,2% 8,0% 8,4%
7 9,4% 10,0% 9,9% 9,7% 9,6%
8 12,1% 12,6% 12,4% 12,2% 11,5%
9 17,0% 17,0% 16,5% 16,2% 14,7%
10 35,7% 31,9% 30,8% 31,9% 27,3%
Table 6: Income distribution by Decile
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
Figure 5 presents Lorenz and concentration curves for aggregate pub-
lic expenditures and market income and also these curves for every income 
concept that express the redistribution through taxes and public expenditures. 
Social expenditures, direct transfers and non-contributory expenditures are 
progressive in absolute and relative terms, while indirect subsidies benefi t 
the rich in absolute terms.  Lorenz curve corresponding to fi nal income lies 
above that of market income, showing that public intervention improves 
income distribution.
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Figure 5: Lorenz and Concentration Curves
       (a)Aggregate Public Expenditures              (b) Redistributional Effect 
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
VI.5 Poverty
Table 7 shows the results on poverty. The picture is roughly similar 
than that of inequality; most impoverished households benefi t strongly from 
direct and in-kind transfers (health and education); the richest receive a 
greatly reduced proportion of these benefi ts. the impact on lowest deciles is 
much higher when considering pensions as a public transfer.
As an analogous to the income distribution analysis by decile, Table 
8 presents the distribution by socioeconomic group based on poverty analysis. 
For instance, 0.9% of income concentrated by population lies between $2.50 
and $4 per day before public policies. After direct taxes, this proportion 
rises to 1.4%; direct transfers reduces this proportion to 0.8% and indirect 
taxes and transfers increases the share to 1.6%.
The greater proportion of income concentrated by population lies in 
the fi fth bracket (10 to 50), meanwhile fi scal system reduces the population 
below poverty lines, even in the highest bracket. Consequently, 30.9% of 
income concentrated by population was over $50 PPP when considering 
market income, while when considering consumable income that percent-
age reduces to 13% in the consumable income. This feature refl ects the 
redistributional impact of public policies, because the richest two brackets 
reduce their share while the remaining four increase the amount of income 
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they concentrate. However, these features are slightly reversed when look-
ing at the fi nal income distribution, because although the lowest brackets 
increase their share as well as the highest bracket, at the expense of the 
middle income brackets.
Group
Benchmark case
Market 
Income
Net 
Market 
Income
Disposable 
Income
Consumable 
Income
Final 
income
y < 1.25 0,03% 0,05% 0,02% 0,03% 0,35%
1.25 < = y < 2.50 0,27% 0,36% 0,13% 0,27% 1,05%
2.50 <= y < 4.00 0,95% 1,36% 0,80% 1,61% 2,47%
4.00 <= y < 10.00 8,12% 12,22% 12,46% 17,91% 11,94%
10.00 <= y < 50.00 59,77% 69,24% 70,11% 67,15% 57,23%
50.00 <= y 30,87% 16,77% 16,47% 13,03% 26,96%
Total 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
Table 8: Poverty distribution by Socioeconomic Group
VI.6. Fiscal mobility
Tables 9 to 11 expose the fi scal mobility matrices, which have been 
presented with the same disaggregation as the tables presented previously.
These tables display mobility through different income groups; that is: 
extreme poverty (y<$1.25); moderate poverty ($1.25<=y<$2.50 and 
$2.50<=y<4) ; middle class ($4<=y<$10 and $10<=y<$50); and high in-
comes ($50<=y). The rows display the initial income (100% horizontally) 
and the columns mean income that accrue to poverty brackets after taxes 
and transfers.
Considering the impact of direct taxes and transfers, around 27% 
of population under extreme poverty in the market income group remain 
in that condition in the disposable income classifi cation. That means that 
around 73% can get out of that condition after direct taxes and transfers 
and are between $1.25 and $10 PPP when considering disposable income; 
41,6% remain in the second bracket ($1.25 to $2.50) and 17% climb to the 
third bracket.
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
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When comparing market to consumable income, 38.1% of popula-
tion are below $1.25 PPP, which means an increase from disposable income 
through the effect of indirect taxes and transfers because they pay indirect 
taxes to a higher extent that the indirect subsidies they receive, meanwhile 
19.6% remain in the $2.50-$4 bracket.
When analyzing market income and fi nal income groups, about 80% 
of population that were below extreme poverty threshold considering market 
income are between $4 to $10 PPP when considering fi nal income due to 
the effect of in-kind taxes and transfers. As can be seen, when considering 
the highest bracket, due to the redistributional feature of taxes and transfers, 
only 34% of population that started with an income that was higher than 
$50 stays in the same poverty bracket, while the remaining 66% lies in the 
$10-$50 bracket.
VII. Pඈඅංർඒ ඌංආඎඅൺඍංඈඇඌ
Along the last decade, Argentina has been carrying out expansionary 
fi scal policies whose main effect has been the reduction in existing inequality 
levels regarding market incomes. Among these policies, Sistema Integrado 
Previsional Argentino y Movilidad Jubilatoria (SIPA), a periodical increase 
in pensions defi ned by law, and "pension moratorium" (an anticipated re-
tirement program combined with a moratorium for those who would have 
not fulfi lled the mandatory 30 years of contributions to the pension system 
have been implemented. Additionally, the creation of a universal program, 
Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH), extended the benefi ts that formal 
workers receive based on the amount of dependants to the ones that work in 
the informal sector and to the unemployed people. 
On the tax side, the increase in the participation of Personal Income 
Tax, mainly due to the lack of adjustment in thresholds and brackets related 
to infl ation; Corporate Income Tax, due to the lack of adjustment in corpo-
rations´ balance sheets; the introduction of Export Duties, with the aim of 
capturing windfall gains arising from the increase in international commod-
ity prices, and the renationalization of the pension system have been the 
factors that have allowed to fi nance, especially in the fi rst part of the decade, 
the aforementioned expansionary policies. In the second half of the decade, 
however, infl ation tax has signifi cantly substituted that revenue from taxes. 
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Public expenditure has risen to around 45% of GDP in 2014 consid-
ering the national and provincial governments, while tax burden has rides to 
around 32% of GDP in 2014, one of the highest historical levels. This im-
plies that fi scal defi cit has increased to unprecedented levels in recent history 
(2.5% of GDP in 2014 at the national level, while for 2015 the most con-
servative estimations place it in the surroundings of around twice as high). 
Additionally, GDP growth has stagnated (-2.6% in 2014; statistics for 2015 
considered  a 2.3% growth). 
Table 2 showed that the impact of public policies regarding the re-
duction in disparities has been signifi cant. However, several issues should be 
considered. On the expenditure side, although the incorporation of a higher 
portion of monetary transfers has produced an important change the com-
position of expenditures, economic subsidies have increased, from 2.2% in 
2003 to 6.4% of PBI in 2014 and have generated important differences with 
production costs, which do not comply with effi ciency criteria and originated 
distortions in relative prices.
Not only economic subsidies have constituted a signifi cant explana-
tion of fi scal defi cit, but also they have not fulfi lled the aims for which they 
had been introduced, according to the authorities, because energy production 
has stagnated (see Rossignolo, 2016). 
The aforementioned distortion in relative prices has generated in 
family budgets a reassignment in the composition of expenditures, given the 
fact that low tariffs have allowed the increase in consumption of these goods 
(electricity, gas, transportation, etc.) . If it were assumed, for instance, that the 
prices of the other demanded goods were near marginal costs, while energy 
and transportation have tariffs that are far lower than marginal costs, this im-
pulses its excessive and ineffi cient use when compared with its optimal level.
But additionally, these subsidies convey inclusion errors when cov-
ering sectors that do not need them. Expenditure in these sectors, although 
progressive, is quantitatively more concentrated in highest income sectors 
rather than lowest ones  (poorest 20% receives around 12% of these ex-
penditures, while the richest 20% gets around 35% of these benefi ts). Figure 
5 showed concentration coeffi cients of these subsidies and, as it can be seen, 
positive values show that these are progressive in relative but not in abso-
lute terms. Consequently, concerning public expenditures, the emphasis on 
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equity should include a reduction in subsidies, focalizing its reach within the 
sectors that really need them. 
Starting from the previous analysis, a simulation was carried out (Sim-
ulation I) in a partial equilibrium context, that consisted in maintaining the 
subsidies for the tariff brackets of lowest electricity consumption, whereas 
for gas, subsidies were cut in half. In both cases, subsidies were focalized in 
the benefi ciaries of AUH, as an example of a targeting mechanism ("social tar-
iffs"). Total subsidies (electricity, gas and airfare tickets) were reduced in 66%. 
The result of this simulation determines that these subsidies turn to 
be more progressive; starting from a concentration coeffi cient of 0.3130 in 
the benchmark case, focalization turns these expenditures into progressive in 
absolute terms, with a coeffi cient of -0.5053. Inequality reduces, given the 
fact that Gini from Final Income is lower that of the benchmark case (Tables 
2 and 12), meanwhile poverty increases slightly regarding the strong relative 
weight of the reduction in the amount of subsidies (1.9% of GDP).
Group
Benchmark case
Market 
Income
Net Market 
Income
Disposable 
Income
Consumable 
Income
Final 
income
Gini 0,481 0,435 0,403 0,391 0,293
Headcount index
$2.5 PPP 4,7% 5,1% 1,8% 3,3%
$4 PPP 12,3% 13,9% 7,3% 13,3%
National Moderate PL (INDEC) 10,9% 12,5% 3,6% 6,6%
Other Moderate PL (FIEL) 29,0% 33,3% 24,9% 36,3%
Table 12: Gini and Headcount Index for Different Income Concepts 
Simulation I 
Given the fact that poverty increases slightly, it interesting to analyze 
income mobility. Table 13 shows  income mobility matrix, which was built 
by comparing proportions of population that, through the action of public 
sector by means of paying taxes and receiving the benefi ts of public expendi-
tures, go up in poverty brackets. this table shows the difference (%) between 
population percentages in each bracket for the benchmark case and the case 
with the removal of subsidies. 
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
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The table should be read horizontally, For instance, considering the 
richest population bracket according to market income, the reduction in sub-
sidies makes 1.8% of that population fall into the less rich category. Taking 
into account the poorest bracket, around 1.5% of population that had been able 
to climb up to the second and third bracket now fall again to the fi rst one.15 
Table 13: Fiscal Mobility Matrices 
Differences in % between the benchmark case 
and the case with reform in subsidies
Consumable Income groups
Market Income 
groups y < 1.25
1.25 <= y 
< 2.50
2.50 <= y 
< 4.00
4.00 <= y 
< 10.00
10.00 <= y 
< 50.00
50.00 
<= y
y < 1.25 1,06% -0,51% -1,01% 0,11% 0,31% 0,04%
1.25 <= y < 2.50 0,34% 1,60% -2,80% 0,37% 0,49% 0,00%
2.50 <= y < 4.00 0,00% 0,78% 1,28% -2,32% 0,11% 0,15%
4.00 <= y < 10.00 0,00% 0,00% 1,33% -1,91% 0,31% 0,27%
10.00 <= y < 50.00 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 1,69% -1,63% -0,03%
50.00 <= y 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 1,81% -1,81%
Could there be a compensatory policy? There are many ways of pro-
tecting affected sectors with monetary transfers, reduction in VAT, social tar-
iffs, etc. Use of monetary emission  has caused infl ation to stabilize around 30 
to 35% annually with the consequent effect in poverty levels. Infl ation mod-
erates the effect of the said transfers in terms of their impact on poverty and 
inequality, and also in its macroeconomic expansionary effect in consumption. 
On the tax side, VAT generates the highest revenue (around 7% GDP) 
although its effects on income distribution are well known: as it affects more 
importantly those who spend a higher proportion of their incomes on con-
sumption, its affects regressively income distribution.
Consequently, the aim is to perform public policies that would reduce 
fi scal defi cit without affecting, or if possible improving income distribution 
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
15. But as it can also be noted, focalization of subsidies can also reduce inequality and increase the 
proportion of lowest income people that stay in the same poverty levels.
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while reducing poverty considering a partial equilibrium context. Strengthen-
ing of monetary transfers appears as essential, meanwhile, regarding taxes, a 
reduction or elimination of VAT in the basic food basket restricting its scope to 
the benefi ciaries of monetary transfers would diminish its regressive feature.
Two additional simulations were produced. The second simulation 
(Simulation II) consisted in increasing monetary transfers, in particular, 
AUH was increased in 100% compared to 2012 values and its scope was 
expanded in order to include Monotributo taxpayers (originally excluded by 
law), which entails a fi scal cost of 0.7% of GDP. Results are shown in Table 
14. It can be seen that poverty reduces strongly considering Consumable 
Income, and its reduction is higher than the benchmark case.16 
Market 
Income
Net Market 
Income
Disposable 
Income
Consumable 
Income
Final 
income
Gini 0,483 0,438 0,393 0,391 0,295
Headcount index
$2.5 PPP 5,5% 5,8% 1,0% 1,8%
$4 PPP 13,1% 14,7% 4,8% 9,4%
National Moderate PL (INDEC) 10,9% 12,5% 3,6% 6,6%
Other Moderate PL (FIEL) 29,0% 33,3% 24,9% 36,3%
Table 14: Gini and Headcount Index for Different Income Concepts
Simulation II
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
16. Poverty and inequality are higher than the initial case because when building different income 
concepts, and due to the existing information in the household survey, private transfers get reduced 
when public transfers increase. 
The third alternative consisted in eliminating VAT from the compo-
nents of the basic food basket (discriminating by product) for the benefi -
ciaries of AUH. Results are shown in Table 15. Focalization of VAT makes 
this tax to be more concentrated (concentration coeffi cient increases from 
0.3147 to 0.3260), and consequently less regressive, with a fi scal cost of 
around 0.1% of GDP; this alternative reduces poverty measured in terms of 
consumable income compared with the benchmark case (Table 2).
Consequently, although the results are slightly different, these al-
ternatives could be effective in reducing poverty and inequality. Figure 6 
compares the results in terms of inequality and poverty variation ($2.5 PPP). 
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The highest poverty reduction is generated with the increase and expansion 
of AUH, while reduction in VAT reduces poverty more than focalization 
of subsidies. Regarding inequality, the reduced budgetary impact of VAT 
reduction reduces its impact in inequality decrease, but Gini coeffi cient is 
however lower than the initial case. Therefore, considering the three impacts 
together, both inequality and poverty could get reduced, even with a reduc-
tion in fi scal defi cit.
Ingreso 
de 
mercado
Ingreso 
neto de 
mercado
Ingreso 
disponible
Ingreso 
consumible
Ingreso 
fi nal
Gini 0,481 0,435 0,403 0,399 0,302
Headcount index
$2.5 PPP 4,7% 5,1% 1,8% 3,0%
$4 PPP 12,3% 13,9% 7,3% 11,9%
National Moderate PL (INDEC) 10,3% 12,0% 5,6% 9,4%
Other Moderate PL (FIEL) 28,8% 33,1% 28,4% 37,5%
Table 15: Gini and Headcount Index for Different Income Concepts 
Simulation III
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
Figure 6a: Changes in inequality and poverty under different alternatives
Gini coeffi cient
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
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VIII. Cඈඇർඅඎඌංඈඇඌ
After the crisis in 2001, which generated an increase in poverty in-
dicators and inequality, the government in Argentina instituted a series of 
policies intended to ameliorate inequality and reduce poverty. Among the 
policies introduced from 2002 to 2003 (Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar)and 
expanded from 2008 to 2009, programs such as Asignación Universal por 
Hijo and Moratoria Previsional have been the most effective. Additionally, 
in order to help expand aggregate demand, indirect (economic) subsidies 
were introduced to keep tariffs on electricity and transportation low for 
greater Buenos Aires residents.
On the tax side, an increase in revenues from direct taxes (income 
tax, social security contributions) through expansions in tax bases accompa-
nied the nominal increase of traditional indirect tax revenues.
This study has introduced the CEQ methodology to analyze the im-
pact of public expenditures and taxes on income distribution and poverty in 
Argentina using ENGHo survey data from 2012-2013. In this paper pensions 
have been considered as a part of market income. The results show a high 
degree of correction in welfare indicators: market inequality is strongly re-
Figure 6b: Changes in inequality and poverty under different alternatives
U$S2.5 PPP Poverty change (%) 
Source: Author´s calculations based on ENGHo.
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duced and poverty is highly ameliorated. However, due to indirect subsidies 
and programs like Asignaciones Familiares, there is still a high spillover 
effect when targeting the poor.
Additionally, the increase in the public defi cit raises the question of 
whether this level of public expenditure can be sustained, given the fact that 
tax revenues have already reached a historic peak. A reduction in spending, 
without greatly altering the impact on inequality and poverty, should neces-
sarily consider diminishing economic subsidies.
A reduction in subsidies imply an increase in tariffs that would gen-
erate a reassignment in families expenditures, that should now derive more 
resources to these goods and adjusting consumption of other goods. Conse-
quently, general equilibrium effects should be taken into account, Increase in 
tariffs, refl ected in prices, imply reduction in real wages affecting aggregate 
demand and increase in poverty. But also a reduction in production would 
be generated, given the fact that costs for companies are also increased. The 
timing for the measures is essential, because compensating policies should 
have immediate effect in familiar expenditures in order to sustain aggregate 
demand and reduce increases in poverty and inequality. 
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